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Abstract
Marginal indirect tax reform analysis evaluates for each commod-
ity (group) the marginal welfare cost (MC) of increasing government
revenue with 1 Euro by raising the indirect tax rate on that commod-
ity. In this paper, I propose an adjustment to theMC-expressions to
allow for (de)merit good arguments and show how this adjustment can
easily be parameterised on the basis of econometric demand analysis.
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1 Introduction
Marginal indirect tax reform (MITR) analysis is probably one of the most
practical applications of public economics. It oﬀers clear-cut guidelines for
reform policy and allows itself to an empirical implementation by means of
household expenditure data, eﬀective indirect tax rates, estimates for aggre-
gate demand elasticities and a set of welfare weights.1
The standard MITR model is very welfaristic in nature in that it as-
sumes the government to endorse the sovereignty of the households in the
∗Comments by Agnar Sandmo are greatfuly acknowledged.
1See Ahmad and Stern (1984, 1991) for India and Pakistan, Decoster and Schokkaert
(1989) for Belgium, Madden (1995) for Ireland, Kaplanoglou and Newbery (2003) for
Greece, Schroyen and Aasness (2002) for Norway.
The standard MITR model is very welfaristic in nature in that it as-
sumes the government to endorse the sovereignty of the households in the
economy, fully respecting their decisions regarding the consumption of goods
and services. In reality, though, both through statements and through policy
measures governments reveal a desire to deviate from consumer preferences
for commodities like alcohol and tobacco. Not only try governments to
better inform their citizens about the health risks involved, they also try
to discourage consumption through excise policy and marketing restrictions.
More recently, the World Health Organization has recommended national
governments to impose a tax on sugar as an instrument in their battle against
obesity. Such arguments are called merit good arguments, and economists
have traced out the implications for optimal commodity tax rules. I refer
here to an article by Besley (1988) and myself (Schroyen, 2004).
In this paper, I investigate how such merit arguments can be incorpo-
rated in MITR analysis. In particular, I show how the central expressions
for that analysis—the marginal welfare cost of rasing an extra Euro by means
of the indirect tax rate on good i—need to be amended to allow for merit good
arguments and how these expressions can be parameterised in terms of ag-
gregate demand elasticities. To model merit goods arguments, I choose the
numéraire function approach proposed in Schroyen (2004) (where I also ex-
plain why Besley’s approach is flawed). But since I want to arrive at decision
rules that are easily implementable in practise, I will make use of the distance
function rather than the numéraire function to model the preferences of the
government.
2 The model
Households
A representative household has preferences that can be represented by
a strongly quasi-concave utility function on n commodities: u(x1, ..., xn).
Facing a vector of consumer prices q = (q1, ..., qn) and having a disposable
income m, it solves the problem
max
x
u(x) s.t. q0x = m. (1)
Denoting π def= q
m
as the vector of normalised prices, the solution may be
written as x(π) yielding a utility level v(π). If subscripts with u denote
partial derivatives, the first order conditions for (1) may be written as
ui(x(π))P
j uj(x(π))xj(π)
= πi (i = 1, ..., n). (2)
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Household’s preferences may also be represented by the distance function
d(x, u). This function is implicitly defined as
u(
x
d(x, u)
) = u (all x, u); (3)
it is the factor by which the commodity bundle x needs to be scaled down to
generate a utility level u.2 It can be shown that ∂d(x(π),v(π))∂xi = πi and hence
the derivative provides a measure of the household’s marginal willingness
to pay for commodity i; the cross-partial derivative ∂
2d
∂xi∂xj
is the so-called
Antonelli substitution eﬀect—see Deaton (1979) on these matters.
Government
Suppose now that the government considers commodity xn as a (de)merit
good. Convinced of the (de)merit properties of this commodity, it believes
that in order for the consumer to reach utility level u, all commodities should
be scaled down by more (less) than d(x, u), for instance by the amount
D(x, u) = d(x, u) +
Z xn
0
µ(χ)dχ. (4)
In terms of the marginal willingness to pay, we have
∂D(x, u)
∂xi
=
∂d(x, u)
∂xi
(i 6= n), and (5a)
∂D(x, u)
∂xn
=
∂d(x, u)
∂xi
+ µ(xn) (5b)
so that the government believes that the household should be willing to pay
µ(xn) extra for good n when consuming a bundle (x−n, xn) yielding utility
level u. It can easily be shown that
U(x) = u
µ
x
1−
R xn
0
µ(χ)dχ
¶
(all x). (6)
is the utility function to which the government subscribes.3
From now on I assume that µ(χ) takes the constant value µ so that the
denominator becomes 1−µxn. If good n is a demerit good, µ < 0. Letting
2In contrast, the numéraire function specifies the amount of a numéraire commodity
which, together with the quantities of the other commodities, generates a certain utility
level. For empirical purposes, it is desirable to avoid the choice of a commodity (category)
as numéraire.
3Define U(·) as U( xD(x,u) ) = u (all x, u), then U(x) = u if D(x, u) = 1. From (3) and
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exi be a shorthand for xi1−µxn , the marginal utilities for the government are
then
Ui(x) =
ui(ex)
1− µxn
+ δin
X
j
uj(ex)xjµ
(1− µxn)2
(all i), (7)
where δin = 1 if i = n and 0 otherwise. Normalising these by dividing
through by
P
k Uk(x)xk =
P
k
uk(ex)exk
1−µxn then gives
Πi(ex(µ), µ) def= ui(ex)P
k uj(ex)exj + δinµ (all i). (8)
Clearly, if µ→ 0, the government’s normalised ’demand prices’ coincide with
those of the household.
I now propose to approximate Πj(ex(µ), µ) by a first order Taylor expan-
sion around Πj(ex(0), 0) = πj. This gives
Πi(ex(µ), µ) ' πi + "ÃX
k
∂πi
∂xk
xk
!
xn + δin
#
· µ (all i). (9)
The round bracket term denotes a pure scale eﬀect, i.e. the eﬀect on the
normalised demand price for a commodity of an equi-proportional increase
in all quantities. I denote these as gi (i = 1, ..., n). It can be shown that
gi =
dπi
d logX , whereX is the Divisia quantity index (see Barten and Bettendorf,
1989, p 1512). We may then write (9) as
Πi(ex(µ), µ) ' πi + gixnµ+ δinµ (all i). (10)
Merit considerations thus aﬀect the marginal willingness to pay in two
ways. First, the government’s MWP for the merit good (n) will exceed the
private one with µ. Second, and less straightforwardly, merit considerations
make the government regard the household better oﬀ than it is aware oﬀ
itself, due to all the infra-marginal units consumed of good n. This has a
scale eﬀect which, for all normal goods, reduces the MWP.
(4)
u
Ã
x
D(x, u)−
R xn
0
µ(χ)dχ
!
= u (all x, u)
so that
U(
x
D(x, u)
) = u
Ã
x
D(x, u)−
R xn
0
µ(χ)dχ
!
(all x, u).
Evaluating this at D(x, u) = 1 finally gives (6).
Notice that
R xn
0
µ(χ)dχ = µ(eχ)xn (some eχ ∈ [0, xn]) and therefore that it has the
dimension of a budget share (since µ has the dimension of a normalised price).
4
3 Marginal cost expressions
In MITR analysis, one is interested in the marginal cost in terms of social
welfare, W , of raising government revenue, R, with one Euro by changing
the tax on commodity i (i = 1, ..., n):
MCi = −
∂W/∂ti
∂R/∂ti
(i = 1, ..., n) (11)
If MCi > MCj then welfare can be increased by lowering the indirect
tax rate on commodity i and raising the one on commodity j in a budgetary
neutral fashion.
Expressions of this kind have been discussed in detail by Ahmad and Stern
(1984), who show that a neat parameterisation is obtained by multiplying
nominator and denominator by the respective after tax prices qi. Since the
(de)merit good arguments only aﬀect the nominator, I limit myself to this
part of the MC-expression.
In this representative household economy, the obvious measure of social
welfare is U(x(π)). The eﬀect of a marginal change in the excise tax rate on
commodity i (i = 1, ..., n) on the social welfare is then
−∂W
∂ti
= −
X
j
Uj
∂xj
∂πi
1
m
= −
µP
k Ukxk
m
¶X
j
UjP
k Ukxk
∂xj
∂πi
. (12)
The round bracket term shows how the government evaluates the consumer’s
marginal utility of income. Denoting this as γ, the rhs may then be written
as −γ
P
j Πj(ex(µ), µ)∂xj∂πi and upon using the approximating expression (10)
and the fact that
P
j πj
∂xj
∂πi
= −xi (adding-up), we get
−∂W
∂ti
' γ
"
xi −
X
j
gj
∂xj
∂πi
µxn − µ
∂xn
∂πi
#
. (13)
Multiplying through by the consumer price qi then gives
−qi
∂W
∂ti
' γ
"
qixi −mµxn
ÃX
j
σjπjxjεji + εni
!#
(14)
where σj
def
=
gj
πi
is the scale elasticity of good j (remember that gi = dπid logX )
and εji
def
=
∂ log xj
∂ log πi
is the Marshallian elasticity of the demand for good j w.r.t.
the price of good i.
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As µ has the dimension of a normalised price, mµ has the dimension of
a price and one may represent it as ηqn. The reduction on the consumer’s
welfare—as perceived by the government and measured in Euro—is then
−qi
∂W
∂ti
' γ
"
(qixi)− η (qnxn)
ÃX
j
(qjxj)σj εji + εni
!#
(15)
Household welfare goes down to the extent it spends disposable income
on commodity i. But the increase in the consumer price qi has the additional
eﬀect of changing the consumption pattern of all goods and to the extent (η)
that merit good considerations drive a wedge between the consumer’s and
the government’s MWP, this needs to be accounted for—hence the big round
bracket term.
Expression (15) is for a representative household economy, but lets itself
easily extend to a heterogenous population. Attaching a social weight λh to
household h (h = 1, ...,H) we get
−qi
∂W
∂ti
'
X
h
(λhγh)
"
(qixi)
h − η (qnxn)h
ÃX
j
(qjxj)
h σhj ε
h
ji + ε
h
ni
!#
.
(16)
The small round bracket terms denote expenditure levels, and are available
from household survey data, while the scale and price elasticities can in
principle be estimated. Very often though, these estimates are only available
from demand analysis at the aggregate level, and should be replaced by them.
For a given set of welfare weights (λhγh) and merit parameter (η), it is then
possible to calculate and rank the diﬀerent MCis.
4 Retrieving scale elasticities from regular es-
timation results
Finally, I want to show how estimates for the Marshallian price elasticities
(εji) and Engel income elasticities (ηi) together with average budget shares
(wi) can be used to construct the corresponding scale elasticities (σi).
Let w = (wi), E = (εij), η = (ηi) and denote the diagonal matrix with
budget shares as wˆ. The matrix of compensated price elasticities is then
given by Ec = E+ηw0. Define now S def= wˆEc and b def= wˆη. This matrix and
vector are the Rotterdam parameterisation of the regular demand system in
diﬀerential form, i.e.
wˆd log x = b[−w0d log π] + Sd log π. (17)
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If ι denotes the vector of units, then ι0b = 1, S = S0, Sι = 0, and y0Sy < 0 (all
y 6= αι, α real scalar).
Consider now the bordered matrix
¡
S w
w0 0
¢
. This matrix has rank n+1, and
is invertible into
¡
T ι
ι0 0
¢
. The matrix T has the properties (i) TS = I − ιw0,
(ii) Tw = 0, (iii) T = T 0, and (iv) y0Ty < 0 (all y 6= αw, α real scalar).4
Pre-multiplying (17) through by T , making use of (i) and rearranging then
gives
d log π = Twˆd log x− (Tb+ ι)d logX, (18)
where I used the fact that w0dlog π = −w0dlog x = −dlogX (the change in
the Divisia quantity index). The vector of scale elasticities σ is therefore
given by −(Tb+ ι) with the property w0σ = −1.
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